As the European war started, exports increased and gold flowed to the United States in payment. As the Federal Reserve Act lowered the reserve requirement against deposits, considerable amount of excess reserves accumulated in the banking system. Price levels rose rapidly, with wholesale prices increasing about 75 percent by mid-1917. During its first two and a half years, however, the Federal Reserve had almost no power to control the monetary and credit situation and had little opportunity to develop instruments of general monetary policy.
On the other hand, the Federal Reserve succeeded in cooperating with the government in selling four wartime Liberty Loans and a Victory Loan. Concerning the war loans' mechanism, the following argument reveals Strong's viewpoint clearly:
The general theory about Government loans and the injustices which they create has been that after war is over high taxes are largely applied to the reduction of the debt, meaning that the poorer classes, who own no bonds, are taxed to pay interest and principal to the richer classes who do. This has all been in our minds in connection with these campaigns and we have sought by every means in our power, including the patriotic appeal, to reach the poorer and wage earner classes, to make them bond holders and better citizens, and the collectors of interest and principal rather than simply payers of taxes. It has been one of the main principles behind our whole program. 3) By the end of the war, the European allied powers owed the United States about $12 billion, of which a little under $5 billion was due from Britain and $4 billion from France. 4 American bankers and government officials ("elites") understood well that the U.S. loan was necessary for the European recovery and without it the U.S. export to Europe would not expand adequately.
William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic candidate for the Presidential election in 1896 said without hesitation that the Federal Reserve system was controlled by Wall Street speculators, and that it was engaged in draining the agricultural districts to "keep up a fictitious prosperity among members of the plunderbund. "It would be better to repeal the Federal Reserve Act and "go back to the old conditions" than to turn the system "over to Wall Street and allow its tremendous power to be used for the carrying out of the plans of the money trust." 6) Strong had been staying often for weeks or even months in Europe and became aware of the European situation. He wrote from
London in 1919:
I am convinced that the immediate task now ahead of us which will help conditions over here more than anything else is to get some sort of a definition of the terms of the debt of the Allies to the United States, and particularly of the British debt. I shall not attempt to repeat conversations in detail, but there is undoubtedly in 5) Ahamed, 505. 6) Silvano A. Wueschner, Charting Twentieth-Century Monetary Policy: Herbert Hoover and Benjamin Strong, 1917 -1927 (Greenwood Press, 1999 , 45.
existence here a latent underlying feeling that the Allies have made the great and most vital sacrifices in the war, both of men and finance and in material damage suffered; that our sacrifice have been slight and our profits immense, and that the existence of this great debt due on demand is a sword of Damocles hanging over their hands. I gather by implication that there is a feeling here that we should and have some cancellation of debt all around. It was too indefinite for me to suggest any particulars and it is hard to see how such cancellation could take place without an actual reduction of indebtedness due us, which is not to be contemplated, in my opinion. They seem to have liked each other immediately. Thereafter they kept up a steady flow of correspondence, including not only official letters and cablegrams but also many personal letters on political, economic, and financial topics. Strong saw Norman again in 1919 and then late in 1920 and early 1921. From that time they were together almost every year, sometimes for long periods. They spent long vacations together, a few times at Bar Harbor but more often in southern France. They traveled together to the important capitals of western Europe and often conferred at length with other central bankers. Though drawn together by common purposes, their friendship was genuine and warm. Their associations were so frequent and prolonged and their collaboration so close that it is still impossible to determine accurately their relative roles in developing some of the ideas and projects that they shared. He [Norman] explained that there had developed a decided improvement, especially during the last year or eighteen months…. That the existence of lower interest rates in America than in London had made it possible to substantially close the London market to foreign borrowings….
There were three factors in the situation which might operate at 12) Chandler, 262.
times so seriously to their disadvantage…. First, that the volume of foreign loans placed in this market last year (1924) was unusualmuch the largest ever known. It was due to relative conditions in their country and ours…. Second, that the gradual funding of foreign debts owing to our Government, together with other payments such as those for war materials sold abroad, relief loans, costs of the army of occupations, etc., would likely require in the near future (a few years) payments of possibly $250,000,000 a year in addition to the annual service of existing foreign government loans of an unproductive nature…. Third, that there must be a plain recognition of the fact that in a new country such as ours, …there would be times when speculative tendencies would make it necessary for the Federal Reserve Banks to exercise restraint by increased discount rates, and possibly rather high money rates in the market. But Mr. Norman's feelings, which, in fact, are shared by me, indicated that the alternative-failure of resumption of gold payment -being a confession by the British Government that it was impossible to resume, would be followed by a long period of has not yet fully recovered, is the farming industry and that it so largely depends upon foreign markets. Roughly one-half of all that we export is produced by farmers and one-half of all that we export is cotton and any considerable part of this crop that is left over and cannot be sold makes the price of the whole crop, as you know." 16) The British Government announced its decision to restore gold payments on April 28, 1925. As it turned out, the restoration of sterling with its old parity of $4.86 was seriously overvalued by more than 10 percent. The Bank of England had to keep interest rates high. It was necessary for British industries to cut wages and prices across the economy and endure high rates of unemployment during the latter half of the 1920s. The rise of the exchange rate more than harmed the export such as coal, steel, and shipbuilding. In May 1926, general strike broke out in coal industry. In Germany, the stock market boom was closely linked to a movement by industry to free itself from dependence on bank loans and secure investment funds by selling new stock issues. As the economy grew, demand for capital increased, and rising interest rates were one reflection of this boom. This movement was made more severe by a decline in the German savings rate after January 1927. As market interest rates rose, demand for Reichsbank discounts still being offered at 5 percent also increased, and the bank soon found its rate the lowest in Germany.
"Despite all Schacht' warnings, the temptation to incur short-term American loans for various public and private German indulgences continued unchecked, and part of the borrowed foreign money went straight into the stock exchange for speculation. Schacht feared that he might soon lose control of the mark… Germany was paying reparations with borrowed money while speculators were investing borrowed funds in massive purchases of stocks on margin. Strong considered this question from two different perspectives.
To attempt some such policy, which is what the Federal Reserve System is sometimes urged to do, solely for the purpose of influencing the price of stocks, might duplicate the Italian development. The amount of credit employed in carrying stocks can only be reduced as a consequence of a reduction in the price of stocks. An attempt to reduce the price of stocks cannot be effected without an increase in the cost of credit employed in carrying stocks. I think the conclusion is inescapable that any policy directed solely to forcing liquidation in the stock loan account and concurrently in the prices of securities will be found to have a widespread and somewhat similar effect in other directions, mostly to the detriment of the healthy prosperity of this country.
Some of our critics damn us vigorously and constantly for not tackling the stock speculations. I am wondering what will be the consequences of such a policy if it is undertaken and who will assume the responsibility for it. 24) Strong's health, however, deteriorated badly since the summer of 1928 and could not participate in the debate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York anymore. Norman's last letter to Strong showed his deep sadness on the human destiny.
Dear old friend, How hard and how cruel life is. These past weeks I have often thought and dreamed and spoken of you: I came home expecting most surely to find you on top of the wave. But I sit down in some bitterness to write you such a letter as this….
But what a stage ours has been over these ten or twelve years! Unique-imaginative-far-sighted. Your early dreams set a goal before a world which was then so distracted as to be blind and 24) Chandler, 427. incredulous. Now that goal has been pretty well reached little by little and your dreams have come true and over these years I have watched the process (as no one else has done) with affection and pride. For the rest of my life that belongs to me as a memory which none can take away.
And remember-when the time comes-let me be near to hold your hand and to watch the coming as well as going.
God bless you and my love now and ever. 25) The international financial cooperation led by Strong had been disintegrating towards the end of 1920s, because the alienation of economic interests between the U.S. and European countries inevitably widened during this period. To that must be added that the opposition to Strong's internationalism intensified inside the administration as time went on. Herbert Hoover described that Strong had become "a mental annex to Europe." 26) I would rather agree with Priscilla
Roberts' view:
There is no reason to doubt that Strong believed his work for European currency stabilization also promoted the best interests of the United States. He argued frequently that uncertain exchange rates, especially when the dollar was at a premium against other currencies, made it difficult for American exporters to price their goods competitively. 27) We have been tracing the cooperation among financial elites of the 25) Norman to Strong, September 6, 1928, cited in Chandler, 472-473. 26 
